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1. Introduction
This paper, part of a set describing different aspects of the 2008/9 agricultural input subsidy,
reviews the processes of subsidy implementation, first describing the procedures and achievements
in procuring and selling subsidised inputs, and then comparing this with information from different
stakeholders to investigate access to and use of subsidised inputs by different beneficiaries.
Implementation of the subsidy programme involves a large number of complex and very significant
logistical and organisational tasks with critical seasonal deadlines. Major tasks are shown in figure 1.
This is a highly simplified summary, with a complex set of activities needed for the completion of
each task. These are very large scale tasks requiring interactions between various stakeholders. In
2008/9 this involved selection of over 2.5 million beneficiaries from between 2.5 and 3.5 million
registered farm households, printing and distribution of nearly 6 million coupons, and purchase and
distribution of over 3.4 million bags of fertiliser and of nearly 2.6 million bags of seed – all to tight
deadlines, to roughly 50% of Malawi’s farmers (a significant number of whom are illiterate or semi-
literate) widely dispersed across the whole country, some in remote and poorly accessible areas,
with the constant temptation and threat of fraud or theft of highly valuable commodities worth
approximately MK40 billion (nearly US$300 million) in total, with each fertiliser coupon worth more
than 10% of annual household income for the more than 40% of the population below the poverty
line.
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Figure 1. Major tasks in programme implementation
Stakeholders
FARMERS
MoAFS: HQ, LU, ADDs, DADOs, Ass, FAs
DCs, TAs, VDCs, Police, CSOs
Fertiliser importers, retailers
Seed producers/importers, retailers
ADMARC: HQ, districts, markets
SFFRFM: HQ, depots, markets
Transporters
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2Information on implementation achievements is obtained from five major sources: implementation
reports (predominantly the Logistics Units weekly reports and its annual report), focus group
discussions conducted by the evaluation team with different stakeholders (Ministry of Agriculture
and local government staff, retailers, and rural people) in 8 selected districts, the household survey
conducted by the evaluation team with a sample of 1,982 households across 14 districts and
representing all livelihood zones, a retailer survey conducted by the evaluation team with a sample
of 230 retailers in 6 districts, and reports by other organisations on different aspects of subsidy
programme implementation – notably the report by Chinsinga,2009. We consider and compare
information from these sources on the major tasks and stages of programme implementation in
terms of input (seed and fertiliser) procurement, beneficiary identification and coupon distribution,
and coupon redemption. It has not been possible to obtain information on disbursement or costs of
subsidised grain storage and cotton chemicals, and these are not considered in this report.
2. Fertiliser procurement
In contrast to the two previous years, fertiliser procurement was entirely the responsibility of
government as there were no retail sales of subsidised fertiliser procured by private companies.
Despite delayed parliamentary approval of the budget, planning and tendering for fertiliser
importation and procurement for SFFRFM supplies was conducted earlier than in previous years, and
bidding documents were issued in April 2008 for public opening in early June. A tender evaluation
committee recommended awards in mid June. The actual awards were announced at the end of July
2008 (a little earlier than in previous years) for purchase of 137,831 MT which together with 32,847
MT from previous year stock held under the “buy back” scheme provided a total of 170,678 MT
fertiliser available for the 2008/9 subsidy programme. Subsequent failure or delays in contract
delivery led to new or extended contracts for fertiliser supply amounting to 185,728MT (excluding
the buy back), and final supply to the programme of 218,462 MT made up of 185,758 MT new
procurement and 32,704 MT from the buyback (which was 143MT less than anticipated). The
breakdown of this by region and fertiliser type is given in table 1. This table shows that 88% of the
new procurement was supplied by private importers and only 12% by SFFRFM. This represents a
considerable increase in private sector imports over previous years – in both 2006/7 and 2008/9
private sector imports were just under 100,000 MT and just over 70% of imports. The figures
reported above and in table 1 exclude a further 24,500 MT of fertilisers ordered for flood relief.
Table 1 Fertiliser procurement and availability by region and type (MT)
Fertiliser NPK UREA D Comp. CAN Total % new
supplySouthern Region New procurement 30,770 37,706 1,708 1,728 71,911
Buy back stock 9,704 3,197 418 860 14,180
Sub total 40,475 40,903 2,126 2,588 86,091
Central Region New procurement 33,315 41,055 5,941 5,718 86,029
Buy back stock 5,443 856 1,722 0 8,020
Sub total 38,757 41,911 7,663 5,718 94,050
Northern Region New procurement 11,024 12,761 2,350 1,682 27,817
Buy back stock 4,176 6,091 221 16 10,504
Sub total 15,200 18,852 2,571 1,698 38,321
National New procurement 75,109 91,522 9,999 9,128 185,758
Buy back stock 19,323 10,144 2,361 876 32,704
Sub total 94,432 101,666 12,360 10,004 218,462
New procurement
SFFRFM supply 20,918 2,000 0 0 22,918 12%
Private sector
supply 54,191 89,522 9,999 9,128 162,840 88%
Source: Logistics Unit, 2009
3Fertiliser deliveries began in August and continued through to January. Table 2 shows cumulative
November and December deliveries, uplifts and sales of NPK as percentages of total deliveries,
uplifts and sales (which commenced at the beginning of November). Thus by the end of November
only 72% of final NPK deliveries had been received at Chirimba in the southern region, and only 75%
of final NPK deliveries received at Chirimba had been uplifted from Chirimba to retail markets. These
represented 77% of final Southern Region NPK sales. End of October figures are much lower. Since
NPK is supposed to be applied as a basal dressing at planting time, and planting rains arrive in the
Southern Region in late October or early November, deliveries of only 56% and 75% of NPK to retail
markets by the end of October and November respectively have potentially serious consequences
for timely planting and fertiliser application and hence yields if this delays sales. In 2007/8 much of
the Southern Region received planting rains at the end of October. This was not the case in a
number of areas in 2008/9, which did not receive planting rains until November.
Table 2. Timing of NPK fertiliser deliveries and sales
October November December
Southern region
Cumulative depot deliveries as % final* 51% 72% 95%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final 56% 75% 92%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final sales 57% 77% 94%
Cumulative sales as % final sales 0 50% 76%
Central region
Cumulative depot deliveries as % final* 49% 70% 88%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final 59% 78% 93%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final sales 60% 78% 93%
Cumulative sales as % final sales 0 21% 79%
Northern region
Cumulative depot deliveries as % final* 45% 58% 76%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final 48% 53% 66%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final sales 55% 61% 76%
Cumulative sales as % final sales 0 9% 43%
NATIONAL
Cumulative depot deliveries as % final* 49% 69% 91%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final 55% 72% 87%
Cumulative depot uplifts as % final sales 58% 75% 91%
Cumulative sales as % final sales 0 33% 72%
* Excluding buy back stocks
Source: Logistics Unit, 2009 and Logistic Unit weekly reports
The timing of fertiliser uplifting from depots to markets and of fertiliser sales are not determined
only by the timing of fertiliser procurement and distribution, but also by the timing of coupon
distribution and of the opening of markets. Indeed, late sales and limited secure storage capacity at
markets prevented uplifting from depots, and sales delays therefore led to delays in uplifting, and
this in turn led to storage problems at depots. We discuss the timing of sales later, but first note a
number of other issues and ways that the tender process might be improved:
 Delays in award of tenders increase risks of price rises for those tendering, and since such
risks will be built into tender prices, they tend to inflate prices. Risks were particularly high in
2008 as both fertiliser and fuel prices had been rising dramatically in the period leading up to
the tender submissions. In the period June 2006/7 to June 2008/9 international urea prices
4(bulk E Europe) increased by 265% (from just over $200/mt to $760), DAP prices increased
by 340% (from just under $270/mt to $1,185) and oil by about 95%. In the same period
average delivered fertiliser prices for the AISP rose by around 160% (from $490 to
$1260/mt), and the difference between the international price and the delivered price for
urea (representing a margin, transport and importation costs) rose by 78% (from $280 to
$500/mt). Margins and margin increases are lower on prices averaged across urea and
phosphate fertilisers, but precise figures are difficult to estimate due to lack of specific
published international prices for 23:21:0 (a simple average of urea and DAP prices give a
margin increasing by 15% from $250 to $290/mt over the same period – with a 10% fall in
2007/8).
 One might expect late contract awards to lead to some inflation of contract prices if
international fertiliser prices are fairly stable. However international fertiliser prices peaked
just about the time that the initial tenders were awarded. Urea prices rose by 20% from June
to July 2008, and in September were still 10% above June prices. In October they dropped
dramatically to 64% of June prices, with a further fall to 40% of June prices in November.
Phosphate prices peaked earlier with international DAP prices in July only just above June
prices, and in September they started falling, to 82% of June prices in October, and 52% in
November. If later contracts led to new importation then, prices in these contracts might be
significantly lower than the June tender prices. However if late contracts were looking for
quick supplies, then this would call on private companies holding excess stocks in the
country (as a result of lower than expected demand due, for example, to high prices and
companies’ late exclusion from contracts for retail supply subsidised fertiliser) and these
stocks would have been imported earlier at higher prices. This would be consistent with the
lack of any dramatic price changes between initial and later contracts.
 Late delivery of tendered supplies was common and posed problems to the procurement
process. In order to reduce these problems tender contracts should include penalty clauses
for late delivery of contracted amounts.
 Rapid payment of suppliers is important for reducing supplier costs and hence anticipated
costs for future contracts. The rate of payment of invoices in 2008/9 was similar to that in
2007/8 when measured in terms of total outstanding invoice amounts as percentage of total
invoices at the end of November, December, and January. However the high fertiliser prices
in 2008/9 meant that outstanding amounts in MK were much higher in 2008/9 (MK3,500,
MK3,690 and MK7,700 million for each month in 2008/9 as compared with MK1,595,
MK1,190 and MK2,620 million for the same months in 2007/8).
 Delays in uplifting and sales could have been delayed by slow contracting of transporters for
uplifting. Requests for bids were not issued until mid August and contracts were not
awarded until early September. In the event this did not delay sales: late beneficiary
selection and issue of coupons were more of a problem in many areas.
 Transit losses of fertilisers were generally recovered from transporters but the loss of MK
15,813,215 for 126MT was not recovered.
 Transport costs of MK 42,045,643 were incurred due to imbalances of 2,875 MTS between
deliveries to depots and their sales requirements. These could have been avoided by earlier
reconciliation of supplies and needs.
3. Seed procurement
As in the two previous years, seed procurement was entirely the responsibility of private seed
companies. Seed companies negotiated with the government that farmers should be able to buy
5seed with a seed coupon without any cash top up, and that these coupons would be redeemed by
government for a price of MK 680/coupon. Seed companies were then responsible for stocking retail
outlets (Agrodealers, input supply shops, and ADMARC and SFFRFM markets) with 2kg packets of
hybrid seed or 4kg packets of OPV seed for redemption by farmers. Flexi vouchers could also be
redeemed for cotton legume seed although supplies of legume seed were very limited.
4. Coupon printing, allocation and distribution
The process of coupon allocation involved updating a register of all farm households, local (village)
processes of selection of beneficiaries, allocation of coupons by district and within district by EPA,
printing of coupons, distribution to districts, and issue of coupons to beneficiaries. These have to be
coordinated as regards the determination of numbers of beneficiaries identified and of coupons to
be printed and issued, and this needs to match input procurement.
Registers of farm households in all districts were updated and confirmed in the field from May to the
end of August (with funding in arrears from DFID). This information formed the basis of an initial
allocation of coupons in early September by district for maize and tobacco packages, the former
comprising three coupons (for a bag of maize seed, NPK, and urea), the latter comprising two
coupons (for a bag of D compound and of CAN). District allocations were subdivided by EPA and
village using the farm family register in each district, and the EPA and village allocations were
distributed to DADOs together with blank registration forms for entry of beneficiary names. This
allowed beneficiary identification to start in late September, though a number of districts reported
that this was hampered by lack of funds. Allocations within Districts did not generally follow the EPA
and village allocations specified.
Beneficiary identification was conducted in public meetings facilitated by a multi stakeholder team
including Ministry of Agriculture staff, religious leaders, VDC members, local government, police and
civil society representatives. Beneficiary lists were compiled from this, by village and EPA, and these
were then aggregated at district level and checked by the Logistics Unit against allocations before
distribution registers were printed with beneficiary names by village and delivered to the Ministry of
Agriculture Subsidy Coordinator (from late October to early December). However, further
complications arose from subsequent substantial changes to district allocations in December and
January. Table 3 shows the initial (September) and final (January) fertiliser and seed allocations by
region (appendix 1 contains the same information by district).
As in previous years there is some unevenness between districts and regions as regards initial and
supplementary allocations per household. Initial allocations of maize and tobacco fertiliser vouchers
were relatively evenly distributed across regions, but the northern region got a larger per household
allocation of supplementary vouchers. Mzimba, Thyolo, Mwanza and Mulanje districts had
particularly high overall allocations of NPK and Urea vouchers per household. Supplementary
allocations tended to balance out over - or under- initial allocations with the exception of Mzimba
(where there was over compensation for an initial low per household allocation), Dedza and
Lilongwe (where initial slightly low allocations were followed by very low supplementary
allocations), Thyolo (where a large supplementary allocation followed an initial allocation that was
already above the national average) and Nsanje and Chikwawa (where both initial and
supplementary allocations of maize fertilisers were low due to lower emphasis on maize cultivation
and fertiliser in those districts). A further 11,000 Urea coupons for issue to smallholder tea growers
in Mulanje and Thyolo districts and 4,000 coupons each of NPK and Urea for issue to smallholder
coffee growers in the Northern Region are not included in the above allocation.
6Table 3 initial (September) and final (January) fertiliser and seed subsidy allocations
Initial (September) allocation Extra allocation
(Dec, Jan)
Final (January) revised
allocations
NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize
Seed
CAN,
D comp.
Flexi -seed NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize
Seed
NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize
Seed
Total vouchers
Northern 166,526 166,526 43,208 135,275 153,856 32,370 320,382 198,896
Central 551,441 551,441 114,459 411,891 99,879 20,230 651,320 571,671
Southern 652,033 652,033 42,002 452,835 129,951 61,181 781,984 713,214
National 1,500,000 1,500,000 200,000 1,000,001 253,686 0 1,753,686 1,500,000
Total MT (both) (both) (both)
Northern 16,652.6 NA 4,320.8 NA 15,385.6 NA 32,038.2 NA
Central 55,144.1 NA 11,445.9 NA 9,987.9 NA 65,132.0 NA
Southern 65,203.3 NA 4,200.2 NA 12,995.1 NA 78,198.4 NA
National 150,000.0 NA 20,000.0 NA 25,368.6 NA 175,368.6 NA
Vouchers/farm family
Northern 0.70 0.35 0.18 0.28 0.64 0.07 1.34 0.42
Central 0.70 0.35 0.15 0.26 0.13 0.01 0.83 0.36
Southern 0.81 0.40 0.05 0.28 0.16 0.04 0.97 0.44
National 0.82 0.41 0.11 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.96 0.41
National total includes unallocated vouchers excluded from regions
Source: calculated from Logistic Unit Final Report, Farm family database.
Actual coupon distribution and access depended on the implementation of the formal allocation
processes described above and on access to any other coupons not reported in the above processes.
An initial printing of coupons was compromised by the discovery in early November of a substantial
security breach in coupon printing. New much more secure coupons were then printed for use in
the Central and Northern Regions where coupon distribution had not yet started. Coupon allocations
detailed in table 3 were then bundled up with beneficiary lists and despatched to districts, where
they were rebundled by EPA and village. Very tight security measures were taken to prevent theft of
coupons in this process. Multi stakeholder teams then went out to villages where beneficiary names
were read out from the register and beneficiaries were given coupons in public meetings. However
it is not clear how additional district coupon allocations (as detailed in table 3) were allocated to
beneficiaries. The Logistic Unit Final Report states that (as in previous years) substantially more
coupons than indicated under the formal allocations as detailed in table 3 above were printed and
available for distribution.
5. Coupon redemption and input sales
Coupon recipients then took their coupons for redemption at retail outlets. Fertiliser coupons had
to be redeemed at ADMARC or SFFRFM markets with the payment of MK800, but seed coupons
could be redeemed without payment at agrodealers and other input sellers who had made
arrangements with seed suppliers for seed coupon redemption, as well as at ADMARC or SFFRFM
markets. Sales occurred when suppliers had stocks and beneficiaries had coupons, starting from
early November and continuing into early February.
Reported fertiliser and seed sales are detailed in table 4.
7Table 4 Subsidised fertiliser and seed sales
Maize fertilisers*
(MT)
Tobacco
fertilisers * (MT)
Total *
(MT)
Total**
(MT)
Seed vouchers**
Region NPK Urea D comp. CAN Maize Flexi
North 14,829 15,756 1,944 2,154 34,683 36,752 229,335 109,686
Centre 32,781 32,905 5,573 5,708 76,967 77,443 584,439 462,228
South 40,968 41,178 1,631 2,071 85,848 88,083 747,555 444,696
Total 88,578 89,839 9,148 9,933 197,497 202,278 1,561,329 1,016,610
*Fertiliser breakdown from weekly monitoring figures
**Other figures from Logistic Units Final Report
Two similar but different sets of sales fertiliser figures are presented. Fertiliser sales broken down by
type of fertiliser are obtained from monitoring of market sales. Aggregate sales are calculated from
deliveries to markets less end of season balances reported from markets. The former may be
underestimates as a result of un-reported sales, while the latter may over report sales as a result of
unreported balances. The true figure will therefore lie between the two.
With the seed coupons, farmers purchased 4532 MT of hybrid seed, 833 MT of OPV seed, and 435
MT of cotton seed, and they also redeemed 86 packs of bean seed, 9 packs of groundnut seed, and
221 packs of pigeon pea seed.
Table 5 compares coupon redemptions from table 4 with the coupon allocations reported in table 3.
Some crossing of regional boundaries may have occurred between the Centre and North, but not
with the South (as noted above the South was using different coupons). Over redemption of maize
fertiliser coupons is observed in the South, and of seed coupons in all three regions. District
breakdowns are not possible due to the significant number of vouchers issued without district
identifiers.
Table 5 Coupon redemptions as % of allocations
Region
NPK &
Urea *
CAN & D
comp. *
Total
fertiliser**
Maize
Seed**
Flexi
seed**
Northern 95.5% 94.8% 101.1% 115.3% 81.1%
Central 100.9% 98.6% 101.1% 102.2% 112.2%
Southern 105.0% 88.1% 106.9% 104.8% 98.2%
National 101.7% 97.8% 103.5% 104.1% 101.7%
*Fertiliser breakdown from weekly monitoring figures
**Other figures from Logistic Units Final Report (2009)
Logistics Unit security checks on redeemed coupons issued in the Central and Northern Regions
detected just under 45,000 counterfeits (2% ) and just over 12,000 with duplicate numbers (0.5%).
We discuss later an alternative estimate of unrecorded and counterfeit coupons.
We consider in the following sections different stakeholders’ perceptions of the implementation
process, and estimates of coupon distribution to use of coupons by different categories of rural
people.
6. Total coupon distribution
Total coupon disbursement and inputs sales as reported by the Logisitics Unit were described above.
We now compare these figures with estimates from the household survey. Table 6 gives estimates
of total coupon receipts from the household survey.
8Table 6 Household survey estimates of total coupon receipts
Fertilisers, 2008/9
All fert.
2007/8
Seeds, 2008/9
Urea &
23:20
CAN & D
Comp.
Total fert.
Maize
Seed
Flexi -
seed
Total
seed
1.Coupons received per hhold
Northern region 1.46 0.19 1.65 1.25 0.70 0.04 0.74
Central region 0.93 0.09 1.03 0.89 0.48 0.01 0.49
Southern Region 1.00 0.06 1.08 0.87 0.57 0.02 0.59
National 1.02 0.09 1.12 0.92 0.55 0.02 0.57
Lower 95% confidence limit 0.95 0.07 1.04 0.84 0.50 0.01 0.51
Upper 95% confidence limit 1.09 0.11 1.20 1.00 0.60 0.03 0.63
2. Total coupons received, NSO/MVAC population est. ('000)
Northern region 445 59 504 371 213 13 226
Central region 947 94 1,057 886 496 10 506
Southern Region 1,168 76 1,258 992 668 28 696
National 2,540 224 2,794 2,235 1,369 50 1,419
Lower 95% confidence limit 2,331 167 2,556 2,011 1,216 29 1,245
Upper 95% confidence limit 2,748 281 3,032 2,458 1,523 71 1,594
3. Total coupons received, MoA population est. ('000)
Northern region 697 92 789 580 334 21 354
Central region 1,458 145 1,627 1,365 764 15 779
Southern Region 1,616 105 1,740 1,372 924 39 963
National 3,734 330 4,108 3,285 2,013 74 2,087
Lower 95% confidence limit 3,427 246 3,757 2,957 1,787 43 1,830
Upper 95% confidence limit 4,040 413 4,458 3,613 2,238 105 2,343
4. MoA Voucher allocations ('000)
Northern region 641 86 727 N/A 199 135 334
Central region 1,303 229 1,532 N/A 572 412 984
Southern Region 1,564 84 1,648 N/A 713 453 1,166
National 3,507 400 3,907 4,320 1,500 1,000 2,500
5. MoA Voucher redemptions ('000)
Northern region 612 82 735 740 229 110 339
Central region 1,314 226 1,549 2,060 584 462 1,047
Southern Region 1,643 74 1,762 1,531 748 445 1,192
National 3,568 382 4,046 4,331 1,561 1,017 2,578
Sources: 2009 survey, MoAFS Farm Household Register, 2008 Preliminary census report, Tables 4 & 5.
Table 6 is presented in five panels. The top panel shows the coupons received per rural household
estimated from the household survey. These estimates are then multiplied by the estimated number
of farm families to calculate total coupons received by region and nationally. A difficulty arises,
however, as a result of substantial differences between rural population estimates used by the
National Statistical Office on the one hand and by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security on
the other.
9The NSO estimates of the total number of rural households are based on the 2008 census. Ministry
of Agriculture and Food Security figures are derived from farm household registrations by
agricultural field staff. There are very substantial differences between the two figures. NSO census
figures adjusted using MVAC livelihood zone data give estimates of just under 2.5 million rural
families outside peri-urban and urban and protected areas in 2008, while the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Security estimate is just under 3.7 million farm families (nearly 50% more than the census
estimate). The second and third panels of table 6 therefore show two sets of regional and national
coupon receipts, one calculated with NSO population estimates and the other calculated with
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security estimates. These are substantially different.
If the NSO population estimate is correct then this suggests a very significant number of 2008/9
fertilizer coupons did not reach the rural people for whom they were intended. If however the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security farm family figure is correct then there is still a discrepancy
between Ministry of Agriculture estimates of coupon redemption and the survey estimate, and the
survey slightly overestimates total coupon allocations, but this is within the 95% confidence limits of
the estimate. 2007/8 coupon allocations reported in the household survey were considerably lower
than those reported for 2008/9, but are similar to those reported for 2006/7 (SOAS et al, 2008), and
show a considerable discrepancy from those reported as disbursed by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Security. There appears to be over-reporting of maize seed coupon receipts if MoAFS
population estimates are used, but if we allow for likely confusion in reporting between maize seed
coupons and flexi-coupons used for maize seed, then the combined figures are more consistent.
A very quick and limited indicative check on the differences in NSO and MoAFS population estimates
was conducted in conjunction with the household survey, with a complete listing of households in
three enumeration areas. Unfortunately it was not possible to compare numbers of households
listed with those from the 2008 census or from the MoAFS farm register, due to differences in area
boundaries. However the 2008 listing was compared with the 1998 census household count inflated
by the district population growth from 1998 to 2008 for each site. The 2008 listing was just over 35%
more than the listing predicted by the NSO figures (53% and 58% higher for two sites in the
Southern region, and 7% higher for one site in the Central region). Although interesting, these
results cannot be considered as having any statistical validity. We consider later evidence on the
number of farm families from an analysis of coupon and fertiliser distribution, receipts, purchases
and sales. This suggests that the number of farm families is unlikely to be more than 3.1 million. This
suggests substantial diversion of coupons , which again is discussed later.
In the FGD’s, coupon numbers in 2008/9 were reported as higher and lower than 2007/8 in different
districts (Lilongwe in particular was noted as having a lower allocation – and this is borne out by the
low allocation per household in appendix 1). In the community survey a small (3%) fall in total
coupon allocations in sample villages was reported overall, but this was not distributed evenly across
regions, with reported coupon receipts rising by 7% in the southern region, and falling by 10% and
20% respectively in the north and centre. However the proportion of households estimated as
receiving coupons was lower by about 10% in the North and Centre, but about the same in the
South. In the household survey respondents indicated that the number of coupons had increased in
2008/9 (as indicated in table 6 above), but at the same time a more general view was that the
number of coupons was declining (see table 12 below). It is possible that in addition to differences
in changes between areas, some of the divergent views may be the result of differences in treatment
and perception between initial and supplementary coupon allocations.
7. Coupon targeting
Tables 7 and 8 provide some information about the distribution of coupons within the rural
population. Table 7 shows the proportion of households receiving different numbers of fertiliser
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coupons, and the mean number of coupons received by those households receiving coupons, for
different categorisations of households. A number of points of interest arise from this.
 Nationally 65% of households are estimated to have received one or more maize fertiliser
coupons, and across all categories this does not drop below 54%. As with the 2006/7 survey,
community leaders consistently report a lower percentage of households as recipients.
 Many households (36%) are only receiving only one coupon. As with the 2006/7 survey, this is
less common in the north. This is discussed further below.
 Although significant proportions of households in all the categories identified below receive
coupons, receipt of coupons does vary across categories and seems to be higher for households
in the northern region and for male headed households (though the different here appears to
have declined since 2006/7), to increase with increasing food security, and to increase with
increasing subjective welfare status. Conversely it is lower for female headed households and
for less food secure and for households with lower subjective welfare.
Table 7. Fertiliser Coupon receipts by region, gender & age of head, and food security & subjective
welfare status
Sample
size Urea and/or 23:20 CAN and/or D Comp.
Coupons 0 0.5 1 2 >2
Mean/
recipient 0 0.5 1 2 >2
Mean/
recipient
North 380 28% 0% 14% 50% 8% 2.03 87% 0% 7% 6% 0% 1.52
Centre 719 35% 3% 39% 20% 3% 1.42 93% 0% 5% 2% 0% 1.27
South 883 33% 2% 37% 24% 3% 1.49 95% 1% 3% 1% 0% 1.26
National 1982 33% 2% 36% 25% 3% 1.52 93% 1% 4% 2% 0% 1.32
Male headed 1459 34% 2% 34% 26% 4% 1.55 93% 0% 4% 2% 0% 1.36
Female headed 523 32% 3% 41% 22% 2% 1.45 93% 1% 4% 2% 0% 1.19
Working age head 1530 35% 2% 35% 25% 3% 1.53 93% 0% 4% 2% 0% 1.33
Elderly head 435 28% 4% 38% 0% 30% 1.49 95% 1% 3% 2% 0% 1.26
Maize for 0-3 months 195 43% 3% 38% 16% 1% 1.32 94% 2% 3% 1% 0% 1.01
Maize for 4-7 months 753 30% 4% 41% 25% 1% 1.40 94% 0% 4% 2% 0% 1.39
Maize for 8-10 months 449 27% 2% 35% 31% 5% 1.60 91% 1% 5% 3% 0% 1.32
Maize for >10 months 434 36% 1% 30% 28% 6% 1.77 93% 1% 3% 3% 0% 1.33
Poor 391 40% 5% 38% 17% 1% 1.31 95% 0% 4% 1% 0% 1.09
Ovutika 745 30% 3% 36% 28% 3% 1.50 93% 1% 4% 2% 0% 1.27
Ovutikilako 518 30% 2% 38% 26% 5% 1.56 93% 0% 3% 3% 0% 1.53
>=wapakatikati 298 36% 1% 28% 28% 7% 1.80 91% 6% 3% 0% 0% 1.33
Some of these differences are explored further in table 8 which shows mean gender of household
head, land ownership, asset ownership, food security and subjective welfare. There is a general
trend for means of variables associated with wealth to rise among households receiving more
coupons – a situation also observed in the 2006/7 survey. An additional aspect of this in the 2009
survey is that the most significant differences are found between households with 0.5 to 1 coupons
and those with more than 1 coupon – there are either higher means or more variation among
households with zero coupons. One may hypothesise from this that the redistribution of coupons
which leads to households getting one coupon is from poorer households and/or to poorer
households – and in the second aspect may be more effective in targeting poorer household than
the formal distribution process.
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This observation raises important questions about targeting and coupon allocation and distribution
processes, to which we now turn.
Table 8 Mean Attributes of Households by number of Fertilizer subsidy coupons Received, 2008/9
Fertiliser Coupon numbers per hh
Zero 0.5 to 1 1.5 to 2 More than 2 All Sig.
% hhold female headed 1.26 1.31 1.24 1.17 1.27 *
Owned Area in ha 1.16 1.09 1.48 2.17 1.27 **
Value durable assets (MK) 19,621 15,630 20,340 28,111 18,702
Value Livestock assets (MK) 18,689 22,947 41,807 58,946 28,699 *
Total Value livestock &
durable assets (MK)
38,150 38,098 61,590 87,058 47,025 *
Subjective score of hh food
consumption over past 12
months
1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 *
Subjective score on welfare 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.3 **
Month after harvest that
maize ran out
7.2 7.1 7.9 8.6 7.4 *
*= one or more differences significant at p=0.05, ** = one or more differences significant at 0.01
Since 2006/7, targeting criteria have placed more explicit emphasis on the provision of coupons to
more vulnerable households – emphasising child headed, female headed or orphan headed
households, those infected or affected with HIV and AIDS, guardians or carers of vulnerable people,
being resource poor Malawians and owning land. However continuing difficulties are faced in
applying these criteria to targeting. We discuss these difficulties in terms of processes and
outcomes.
In the focus group discussions, respondents reported that the provision of a targeting guidance
booklet (covering process and criteria) was a valuable tool for open meetings. There were, however,
significant difficulties in applying these as the targeting criteria remain wide, perhaps too wide to be
a useful tool for allocating coupons. In Zomba, communities were asked to identify those unable to
purchase unsubsidised inputs, caregivers for orphans, the elderly, widows or women-headed
households, the disabled and those that will not sell the coupon after receiving it. There were many
people in the villages who fitted these criteria, but very few of them were able to get coupons.
“when we say ‘the well to do’ here in the village, that group is very small while the rest are poor and
poorest…so what we are complaining about is that only a few proportion of the vulnerable group get
coupons…what will the others do?...this is why we have said we did not have enough food during this
season because people did not harvest very well last season…it would have been better if all the
vulnerable we select get coupons”(Women’s Focus Group Discussion, Zomba, March 2009). Some
people recognise the tensions (contradictions) in the targeting criteria but others do not. Thus in
Karonga, criteria identifying labour-constrained vulnerable groups were in use together with criteria
identifying those with productive capacity. A significant difficulty arises in identifying poorer, more
vulnerable who can also afford the redemption fee for coupons.
Fundamental difficulties in targeting therefore arise because of
1. ambiguities, tensions and contradictions among different targeting criteria, related to
2. difficulties in clearly establishing measures for applying these criteria, both of these being
related to
3. large numbers of households apparently deserving of coupons relative to the number of
coupons available.
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8. Allocation and distribution processes
An important innovation in 2008/9 was the introduction of ‘open meetings’ during the registration
and distribution process. The introduction of open meetings appears to have had two objectives:
a) To ensure that AISP beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) are adequately informed about
the operation of the AISP and have realistic expectations; and
b) To include households in the targeting process, removing targeting power from TAs and
village headmen and giving it to the community itself.
On the whole the response to the use of open meetings to inform people about the project was
positive. In Karonga and Kasungu, it was argued that the open meeting allocation and open meeting
distributions helped in reducing struggles and conflicts since people were more aware of how things
were being done. However, even where open meetings reduced tension, they did not necessarily
mean that village members actively took place in targeting. Often, community participation in
targeting decisions was actually limited as a village development committee (usually made up of
village headmen and elites) selected beneficiaries from the list of registered households. For
example in Chikwawa a focus group discussion with women revealed that they had no
understanding of how decisions were reached about who in their village was included in the
AISP,and they had not participated in targeting decisions.
It appears from the FGD information that a key factor of the success of open meetings was whether
coverage had increased or decreased compared to the previous year. In Lilongwe targeting was
difficult because allocations were reduced. However separation of registration from distribution was
helpful because it allowed time for people to find out where they stood.
Progress made in targeting the main / first set of allocated coupons was significantly undermined
when supplementary coupons were allocated. A worryingly high proportion of respondents
reported that supplementary coupons were being distributed based on the choices of traditional
leaders, and in other cases, by politicians. In Karonga, respondents indicated and accepted the fact
that there were supplementary coupons but they said that these coupons followed a more political
channel than the first coupons, coupons distributed by political figures like MPs, party chairpersons
and mainly targeting their supporters and party sympathizers.
Chinsinga (2009) reports similar tensions and difficulties, noting that the use of open meetings was
widely recognised as improving matters, but also that many problems remained as regards targeting
criteria (as noted above), inadequate coupons relative to need, and significant inclusion and
exclusion errors relative to targeting of more vulnerable households. Procedural difficulties arose
due to lack of systems for accountability and raising grievances, and some reported corruption
among stakeholders involved in implementing the programme.
Difficulties with the process are highlighted by mixed views about who should benefit from the
programme, even among rural people. These are illustrated by different views put forward by focus
group discussion participants in Chikwawa, who disagreed about whether more productive or more
vulnerable households should be targeted with the following arguments:
 ‘Coupons should go to the poorest of the poor.’
 ‘It should target everybody because if the well do are sidelined they will not offer ganyu to
the poor hence the poor will not be able to purchase fertiliser and seed.’
 ‘They should give some to the well to do, the not so well to do and poor. This will help the
poor to see how the others are doing in terms of farming.’
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 ‘If the coupons are few they should target female headed households especially those looking
after orphans. They should also target the elderly.’
 ‘No, they should target only those who are going to use the coupons because the poor have
no money. They will just keep it.’
A key lesson from this is one that goes beyond the implementation of the AISP. There is a range of
programmes in Malawi that span agriculture and social protection that are unclear about the
implications of labour-constraints in households for poverty and vulnerability. In some programmes
the rationale for targeting is based on an argument that the poorest in Malawi have no labour,
whilst others target the poor on the basis that they have productive potential. Without clarity,
targeting will continue to result in dissatisfaction and the linkages between different programme will
remain contradictory.
Observations in the FGDs and reported by Chinsinga on the coupon allocation and distribution
systems are supported by survey respondents’ observations summarised in tables 9 and 10, which
show respectively the proportion of households reporting particular coupon allocation and
distribution processes in their villages, and the relative importance of different stakeholders in these
processes.
Table 9. Frequency of coupon allocation and distribution methods by coupon type
Open meeting for: Subsequent
redistribution
Supplementary
allocationCoupon type Region allocation Distribution
Fertilizer voucher North 88% 99% 41% 52%
Central 71% 97% 56% 7%
South 88% 95% 32% 8%
Total 81% 96% 43% 12%
Maize seed voucher North 88% 99% 24% 32%
Central 72% 96% 37% 2%
South 89% 97% 26% 8%
Total 82% 97% 31% 8%
Flexi seed voucher North 72% 80% 12% 14%
Central 66% 86% 31% 1%
South 58% 63% 14% 3%
Total 63% 75% 21% 4%
Table 9 suggests that open meetings were widespread for initial allocation and (particularly)
distribution of fertiliser and maize seed coupons – they were less common but still widespread for
flexiseed coupons. Subsequent redistribution (by the community after external distribution
according to the register) did occur in a significant proportion of cases, particularly in the central
region (this matches the extent of households reporting receipt of one coupon, though the regional
pattern of occurrence differs) . There was little awareness of subsequent supplementary allocations
except in the north – this might be due to greater transparency and or a greater proportion of
supplementary coupons issued in the north. Redistribution and supplementary allocations were also
less common for flexiseed coupons. The same question was asked in the community survey with
similar responses as regards the widespread use of open meetings for coupon allocation and
distribution. Subsequent redistribution of fertiliser coupons was however considered to be less
important in the north (reported in only 22% of communities) and more important in the Centre and
South (where it was reported in 78 and 89% of communities respectively). This regional pattern is
more consistent with the pattern of households reporting receipt of one coupon, though suggests a
higher level of sharing than is reported.
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Table 10 shows that agricultural extension staff are perceived to be important in meetings for
allocation (particularly in the South, and less in the Centre) and almost universally play an important
role distribution of coupons. However they are not perceived to be much involved in subsequent
distribution or in supplementary allocation (except in the North where they were present and played
an important role in 40% of the responses). The importance of VDC members varies with roughly
equal responses across ‘playing an important role’, ‘being present but unimportant’, and ‘not being
present at allocation and distribution meetings’ - although they were almost universally present at
distribution meetings in the north they were not considered to play an important role. Headmen/
TA’s were generally present and played an important role in allocation and distribution meetings
(particularly in the South and least in the Centre). Where redistribution occurred (most commonly in
the Centre) they generally played an important role in it, and this was particularly the case in the
Centre and South. Local politicians were not considered important in any of the four processes (but
were reported as marginally more involved in allocation and distribution meetings in the South).
‘Others’ (police and other officials) are seen as important in the distribution meetings in just under
50% of responses. Respondents in the community survey reported greater involvement of village
headmen in the allocation of supplementary coupons in the Centre and South.
Table 10. Importance of different stakeholders in coupon allocation and distribution methods
Stakeholders Open meeting for: Subsequent
redistribution
Supplementary
allocationAllocation distribution
agric. extension staff North 1.96 1.10 2.54 2.14
Central 2.18 1.14 2.74 2.94
South 1.54 1.26 2.64 2.89
Total 1.86 1.19 2.67 2.83
vdc members North 1.61 1.67 2.42 2.29
Central 1.98 1.97 2.42 2.91
South 1.75 1.77 2.58 2.90
Total 1.84 1.85 2.49 2.84
headman/ta North 1.45 1.49 2.40 2.19
Central 1.70 1.60 2.01 2.88
South 1.34 1.29 2.43 2.86
Total 1.50 1.45 2.24 2.79
local political leaders North 2.89 2.87 2.95 2.96
Central 2.83 2.76 2.94 2.99
South 2.62 2.59 2.89 2.98
Total 2.74 2.69 2.91 2.98
Other North 2.42 1.94 2.70 2.89
Central 2.66 1.89 2.68 2.97
South 2.54 1.97 2.79 2.95
Total 2.58 1.93 2.73 2.96
Scores 1 = present and important
2= present but not important
3 = not present
Table 11 presents answers to questions where respondents were asked to score the extent to which
particular types of household were more or less likely to gain coupons. The results show no clear
perceptions of particular target or beneficiary groups. No strong differences were observed between
the perceptions of people in different areas, or between male and female headed households
(although there is a greater tendency for respondents in the North and a lower tendency in the
South and among female respondents to suggest that more disadvantaged people have a greater
chance of getting coupon). Community survey respondents were also asked which particular groups
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of people were intended beneficiaries. Poorer and female headed households and those with
orphans were generally considered as intended beneficiaries, particularly in the south and north.
These findings are consistent with the pattern of coupon receipts reported by households (as
summarised in tables 7 and 8), with the focus groups discussions, and with Chinsinga’s findings.
Table 11 Likelihood of getting coupons
Region Household head Total
North Central South Male Female
Poor people 1.70 1.74 1.83 1.75 1.86 1.78
Female headed households 1.80 1.93 1.91 1.88 1.97 1.91
More productive farmers 2.17 2.17 1.98 2.11 1.99 2.08
Households with orphans 1.77 1.85 1.88 1.83 1.92 1.85
Better off households 2.33 2.26 1.99 2.17 2.05 2.14
Civil servants and teachers 2.51 2.27 2.09 2.23 2.11 2.20
VDC members 1.86 2.08 1.76 1.92 1.88 1.91
Elderly / sick people* 1.03 1.29 1.59 1.37 1.59 1.46
Chiefs/ headmen & their
relatives* 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.02
Scores: 1 = more likely; 2= no difference; 3 = less likely
* These categories were volunteered by 13% and 1% respectively of respondents as ‘other categories’
and were generally only mentioned by respondents who considered them to be more likely to get
coupons.
9. Perceptions on total coupons and systems over time
It was reported earlier that the focus group discussions suggested that the open meetings in 2008/9
were generally considered to have been an improvement over previous methods. Table 12 shows
respondents’ perceptions of different aspects of programme implementation over the four years of
its implementation.
Table 12 . Scoring on different programme elements by year & alternative targeting systems
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
Number of coupons 2.96 3.02 3.07 3.16
Timing of distribution 2.73 2.73 2.56 2.01
Methods of coupon distribution 2.89 2.94 2.97 2.81
Criteria for coupon allocation 2.95 2.92 2.83
Coupon allocation targeting the poor (100kg fertiliser) 2.42
Coupon allocation targeting the productive (100kg fertiliser) 3.88
Coupons for all households with half the amount (50kg fertiliser) 2.69
Scores : 1 = very good; 2= good; 3 = not good not bad; 4 = bad; 5 = very bad
Rising scores for the number of coupons indicate a perception that the number of coupons is falling.
This perception appears to be strongest in the central region and (unsurprisingly) among households
who did not receive coupons in 2008/9 (not shown in the table), while in the south there is a
perception that the situation has been improving or remaining constant. Falling (and low) scores for
the timing of coupon distribution indicate a perception that this is has improved over the four years,
particularly in the south and centre in 2008/9. Views on changes in methods of coupon distribution
and criteria for allocation are mixed. Although there is no clear overall impression of improvement
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or deterioration, there is a perception in the Centre that this has deteriorated (except in 2008/9),
while in the north and South it is considered to have improved somewhat. It may be difficult to
separate concerns about methods from overall numbers of coupons – those who did not receive
coupons in 2008/9 reported a perception of decline in approval of methods and criteria for coupon
allocation, particularly in 2008/9.
As regards alternative targeting of poor or productive households, or a smaller but universal
package, targeting the poor receives the most approval, closely followed by smaller package
provided to all households. Both these are scored more highly than those experienced over the last
four years, while focussing on productive households is considerably less popular than systems
implemented in the last three years. Female headed households and those who did not receive
coupons in 2008/9 express a stronger preference for these methods. Given the difficulties with
targeting discussed earlier, it is not clear how targeting of the poor could be achieved
In the focus group discussions there were mixed views on whether coverage ought to be increased
by decreasing coupon size to cover 25 kg instead of 50 kg bags. Many argued that, since there is
already dilution, reducing bag size further would have a serious effect on yields. Others suggested
that, given that so many people who met the targeting criteria were excluded, smaller bags would
be fairer.
10. Access to coupons and timing
Just over 5% of fertiliser coupons were reported as being obtained with some payment (the same as
reported in the 2006/7 survey but lower than the 14% reported by Holden and Lunduka, 2010).
Reported sources of such fertiliser included TAs and headmen (approximately 20% of cases),
agricultural staff (5%), VDC members (20%), traders (10%), and others - mainly fellow farmers (45%).
Reported prices varied dramatically, with MK100 to 200 paid to agricultural staff and higher prices to
others (with a median of MK2,000, but higher and lower prices also reported – Holden and Lunduka,
2010, report a median price of MK2,500). Community survey respondents reported higher prices for
coupons being bought, 4,500MK to 5,000MK in the North and Centre but around 1500MK in the
South. These prices were considerably higher than prices reported for the 2007/8 season (400MK to
500MK in the South, 1,000MK in the North and 2,500MK in the Centre, and MK1,500 reported by
Holden and Lunduka, 2010).
An important aspect of access to coupons is the timing of their distribution. As reported earlier (see
table 12), timing of coupon distribution was considered to have improved in 2008/9, particularly in
the South and Centre. Specific information on the time of coupon receipt was collected from survey
respondents and in the community survey. Community survey respondents reported a greater
proportion of communities receiving the first distribution of coupons in the first of November in
2008/9 in the South (63% compared with 49% in 2007/8), a greater proportion receiving coupons by
the end of November in 2008/9 in the Centre (84% compared with 68% in 2007/8), but a slightly
lower proportion receiving coupons by the middle of December in 2008/9 in the North (63%
compared with 69% in 2007/8). Timings for 2008/9 reported by the household survey are a little
later, with 69% and 65% of coupons received by the end of November in the South and Centre
respectively, and 68% by the end of December in the North. These include coupons distributed in
the first and second rounds are earlier than reported in the 2006/7 survey (equivalent figures were
54%, 49% and 45%).
The overall story from the qualitative evidence in the Focus Group discussions was that in most
places the distribution of coupons was timely. Most beneficiaries had coupons before or as the rains
began. The main exceptions to this were districts, or parts of districts, where allocations were
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reduced and the community refused to participate in targeting (because the allocation had been
reduced and so many people would be excluded despite meeting the targeting criteria).
An important implication for timing is that, because many households have to resort to ganyu or
work on public works programmes in order to get the cash required to redeem their coupon, the
poorest households need to receive their coupon sooner to give them time to find and complete
work:
‘Others only got fertiliser in January or even February. They just went to ADMARC to get their
seeds in December because the seed was for free and then they waited until they could get
money to buy fertiliser’ (Women’s Focus Group Discussion, Lilongwe, March 2009)
Timely distribution was not however found everywhere. Participants in Karonga said that coupons
were distributed in December which they considered late because by this time planting rains had
already come and some people recycled maize seed while those who had some money bought
unsubsidised seed. The qualitative evidence suggests, however, that whilst there are numerous
examples of fertiliser and seeds not being available, these are a) not found across whole districts,
indicating idiosyncratic rather than systemic failures in the system or b) associated with the
availability of specific products.
11. Coupon use and redemption
The vast majority of fertiliser coupons are reportedly used to buy fertilisers – 97% for maize
fertilisers and 94% for tobacco fertilisers (though only 90% of tobacco fertiliser coupons in the
Centre). The balance was given away to neighbours or relatives (1% of maize fertiliser coupons) or
sold (4% tobacco fertilisers in the Centre) and not used (2% of maize and tobacco fertilisers in the
centre and south, 4% of tobacco fertilisers). For 4% of fertilisers a secondary use was identified as
‘given away to neighbours or relatives’. Almost all the maize and cotton seed coupons were used to
buy seed (94%), the balance being not used (all of the cotton seed) or given away. Only 12% of
cotton chemicals coupons were used to obtain chemicals (none in the centre), the balance being
given away. 80% of flexi-coupons were reported to be used for obtaining seed, the balance being
given away or unused (15%).
Reasons for not redeeming coupons varied with the type of coupon and region, and for maize
fertilisers and maize seed very small numbers were not redeemed. For maize fertilisers reasons for
not redeeming coupons were fairly evenly divided between coupons being lost or stolen, there not
being stock, lack of money, and other reasons (for example administrative difficulties or sickness).
With tobacco fertilisers the dominant problem was lack of supply of inputs – of CAN in the centre.
Lack of chemicals in stock was the overwhelming reason given for not using the cotton chemical
coupons and for 80% of the 20% of flexi-coupons not used. The very limited reports of coupon
selling (also reported by Holden and Lunduka, 2010) provide a lower estimate of selling than found
in the community survey, where it was considered not to occur at all in only 80% (70% in the central
region), with it occurring ‘rarely’ in just over 15% of communities and ‘commonly’ in 7% (16% in the
Centre). Chinsinga reports that although some selling of coupons was found in most areas, the
practice was less widespread than the previous year, and beneficiaries were more likely to sell inputs
once they had been redeemed.
Focus group discussions emphasised that selling of coupons was the only option for poor people
who could find any way to raise the cash needed to redeem coupons. In Karonga, for example, it
was reported that some people sold coupons because they couldn’t find the money to redeem it
while others sold it because they did not have any use of it – for example some not growing crops
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received coupons. Coupons were reported as costing about MK4,000 and MK5,000 (consistent with
community survey information presented earlier).
The focus group discussions also suggested that there appear to be gender differences in the sale of
coupons with sale being carried out mainly by men. It was proposed in a number of women’s focus
group discussions that it would be better for women to be receiving coupons on behalf of their
households because it would then be assured that the coupon will be used for its intended purpose,
and cases of coupon selling would be reduced. It may also be the case that more men than women
sell coupons because it is risky and women tend to be more risk averse.
Of the inputs obtained with coupons, the vast majority were reported to be used on the
respondents’ plots. None were reported sold, and small numbers of respondents reported holding
over maize seeds (OPV and hybrid) for the next crop. 1% of maize fertiliser obtained though coupon
redemptions were reported as shared with others. Chinsinga however reports more common sale of
subsidised inputs by beneficiaries either to meet immediate subsistence needs or (in areas like
Salima and Chikwawa) because they did not consider that their soils needed fertilizer. As noted later,
examination of low price fertiliser purchases and reported fertiliser use suggests that between 10
and 20% of inputs are resold or shared among smallholders.
Coupon redemption is affected by costs of redemption (in terms of input prices, side payments, time
spent waiting and travelling, and other travelling costs) and by the ability and willingness of
beneficiaries to incur those costs.
In the household survey, 14% of maize and tobacco fertiliser coupons were reported to require
payment of ‘tips’ for redemption above the official 800MK redemption price (this compares with
20% reported in 2006/7). Reported extra payments ranged from 50MK to over 1,000MK, with the
most common (5% of all coupons) being 200MK (a total cost of 1,000MK for redemption and ‘tip’).
Virtually no extra payments were reported for other coupons.
Community survey respondents suggested a greater occurrence of the need for farmers to pay ‘tips’,
particularly in the Centre, with their ‘often’ being required in 37% of communities (49% in the
centre and only 18% in the north), ‘seldom’ being required in 19% of communities, and ‘never’ being
required in 44% of communities (32% in the Centre and 65% in the North). Overall a median tip of
200Mk per bag was reported, with a higher figure of 450MK in the Centre. As compared with
2007/8, the reported frequency of tipping has hardly changed but a very significant reduction is
reported in the North and an increase in the Centre. The same median of 200MK per bag was
reported across the country as a whole and in the South, but a lower figure of 100MK was reported
for the North and the median for the Centre was higher than in the rest of the country, but at
300MK per bag not as high as in 2008/9. Focus group discussions also suggested that the payment of
bribes to redeem inputs was more widespread than is suggested by the survey results. Focus groups
suggested that this was closely related to problems of queuing, as will be discussed later. Chinsinga
also reported ‘tips’ of 200MK to 800MK per bag of fertiliser being demanded by some ADMARC staff
(with those unable to pay being required to wait two or thee days before they were served);
extortion of cash from beneficiaries by criminal elements to ‘facilitate’ input acquisition; and
organised theft through tricking farmers.
Table 13 presents summary data on reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and
costs for transport and miscellaneous expenses. This does not show major differences between
regions. The greater distances to markets and larger differences in distances to ADMARC and
private selling points tend to be in less populous areas and are thus masked in aggregation at
national and regional levels. Distances to actually redeem coupons were greater where inputs were
not stocked in the nearest outlet. Distances to the nearest private sector outlet were somewhat
greater than distances to ADMARC/SFFRFM, particularly in the northern region. The lower time
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travelling and waiting for inputs in the north is difficult to explain. Key informants in the community
questionnaire suggested that distances were larger (median 8km, mean 10 km overall for ADMARC
outlets and median 10km, mean 15 km overall for private company outlets and). Times, expenses
and distances reported for 2008/9 were all higher than those reported for 2006/7.
Table 13. Reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and costs for transport and
miscellaneous expenses.
Hours travel &
waiting
Transport and misc
expenses (MK)
Distance to
nearest
ADMARC (km)
Distance to
nearest private
selling point (km)
mean median mean median mean median mean median
Northern region 11 8 347 200 6 5 16 11
Central region 18 9 352 200 7 6 14 10
Southern Region 17 9 251 150 12 4 15 6
National 17 9 304 200 9 5 14 8
2006/7: National 13 7 247 150 7 5 7 5
Community survey respondents reported on the frequency of stock-outs for different inputs, and
these are summarised in table 14.
Table 14. Mean scores on frequency of stock outs by input by region
Fertiliser Seed
23:21 Urea D comp. CAN Hybrid OPV Beans Gnuts Soya
North 1.45 1.29 1.52 2.00 1.29 2.00 NA 1.27 NA
Centre 1.82 1.41 2.29 2.19 1.34 1.81 2.88 2.81 2.66
South 2.01 1.99 1.73 1.74 1.11 1.06 NA NA NA
All 1.84 1.66 1.93 1.97 1.23 1.71 2.52 2.32 NA
Mean scores: 1 mostly available; 2 somestock outs; 3 frequent stockouts
Source: Community survey
‘Some’ or ‘frequent’ stockouts are noted overall for all inputs with the exception of hybrid seed.
Particular difficulties were reported for D comp and CAN in the Centre, for 23:21 and Urea in the
South (which also had a higher incidence of stock-outs in 2006/7), and for legume seeds. Focus
group discussions noted similar shortages: for CAN and D compound and for legume seed. 23:21:0
was also reported as scarce. This was often associated with difficulties in restocking – fertiliser would
come once to a market and then not be replenished. This was sometimes exacerbated by the use of
particular centres for all farmers from specific areas – while this appeared to improve coordination
of coupon distribution, it all limited farmers’ ability to move around to source supplies from other
markets. This varied with different systems being adopted in different areas. Choice of hybrid seed
variety as also limited in some areas – but nevertheless some beneficiaries tried new seeds that they
found to be successful. Some respondents suggested that problems with availability were due to the
reduced number of outlets where coupons could be redeemed because of the exclusion of the
private companies, and this also exacerbated queuing problems.
As noted earlier, focus group discussions and Chinsinga related the incidence of ‘tips’ and inflated
fertiliser prices to the existence of queues, with queues being both a cause and result of demands
for ‘tips’ (as queues encouraged some farmers to offer and sales staff to demand ‘tips’ for rapid
service, and demands for ‘tips’ which were not met led to farmers waiting for late service). Queues
were associated with limited availability of some inputs. About 75% of outlets suffered from
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frequent major queues (a similar proportion to that found for ADMARC and private sector suppliers
in 2006/7) An important point about queues is that their impact is greatest on poor people, as for
some the additional payments to overcome the queues and limited time available made it
impossible to redeem coupons. Similar points are made by Chinsinga who states that nevertheless
stakeholders generally considered that there were fewer input redemption problems as compared
Finally we consider how households who received coupons found the cash needed to redeem them.
Table 15 summarises reports by recipients of coupons in the household survey, though problems of
fungibility often make it difficult to identify precisely how a cash expenditure is financed. The table
shows that most households used general savings and ganyu was also important. Investigation of
differences by household characteristics shows variation in the relative importance of different
sources, with greater reliance on gifts by female headed households, and falling dependence on
savings and rising reliance on gifts and ganyu for more food insecure and lower welfare households.
The same applies to a lesser extent to reliance on public works programmes and safety nets.
Table 15 Primary sources of cash for input purchase by region, gender & age of head, and
subjective welfare & food security status (% coupon recipient households)
savings loan gift
pwp/safety
net ganyu other
North 83% 0% 4% 0% 7% 6%
Centre 79% 1% 4% 2% 11% 3%
South 73% 3% 5% 1% 13% 5%
National 77% 2% 4% 1% 11% 4%
Male headed 81% 2% 2% 1% 11% 4%
Female headed 66% 3% 11% 1% 13% 6%
Poor 60% 5% 9% 3% 19% 5%
ovutika 76% 2% 5% 1% 12% 4%
Ovutikilako 86% 1% 1% 0% 8% 3%
>=wapakatikati 84% 0% 3% 1% 6% 7%
Maize for 0-3 months 59% 5% 9% 2% 21% 4%
Maize for 4-7 months 75% 2% 4% 1% 13% 4%
Maize for 8-10
months
84% 1% 3% 1% 9% 2%
Maize for >10 months 81% 2% 5% 1% 5% 7%
Source: AISS
Focus group discussions reported similar ways in which people accessed cash to redeem their
coupons – and also selling livestock (like chickens, goats and pigs), selling maize they were storing,
and remittances from children. Remittances were important but only for a limited number of
beneficiaries.
Income from safety nets was important for those who got access to safety nets – mostly public
works in the form of road construction for MASAF. Both men and women got access to safety nets,
but only limited numbers (less than 20 households) in any given villages were selected to participate.
Households usually received 10 or 12 days of work each year and were paid K200 / day. Over the
last two years, some public works had shifted payment type. In Mzimba, participants were paid in-
kind (a bag of fertiliser and a some seed) in 06/07 whilst in 07/08 they received cash (K2,400 for 12
days of work). It was not clear whether this was a explicit attempt to make safety net income help
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poor households get cash to redeem their coupons (sometimes public works took place before
coupon distribution, and sometimes after) or whether this was part of a broader trend towards cash
rather than in-kind payments among various social protection programmes in Malawi.
There were other examples of safety nets, including food distributions by WFP and NGOs, and school
feeding programmes. Households that benefitted from these safety nets still faced the problem of
getting access to cash. They frequently resorted to the (distress) sale of small livestock.
There were very few examples of households accessing credit to help them redeem coupons. In
Phalombe, World Vision was offering credit to support fertiliser purchase but local officials
expressed concerns that, because they were an international NGO, defaulting rates would be high.
Whilst respondents recognised the importance of safety nets in providing cash that could be used to
redeem coupons, they cautioned against linking the AISP targeting to safety nets. They argued that
this was only a feasible strategy if coverage of safety nets was higher. There were good reasons to
link timing of safety net provision with the AISP and to continue to make safety net payments in cash
rather than in-kind. This would result in vulnerable groups being empowered financially through the
safety net programme to enable them to purchase subsidised inputs. This then requires that safety
net programmes should be taking place in good time before coupon distribution so that people have
the money when receiving the coupons and also have time to plan on how they will buy the inputs.
Timely payment for safety net work is then doubly important.
The timing of the safety net programme, not just of payment, is also important: if it is out of step
with the AISP it has limited positive effect:
This [the safety net] comes in bad time because it came when people were suppose to be
taking care of their crops in the garden. The poorest suffered a lot because most of them
they do not share their time properly and because most of the time they do not eat so they
feel weak, so its hard for them to go in the afternoon to farm, some instead they go to do
ganyu to find food for their households. The averaged mostly do not go got these
programmes because they know they have money they can buy whatever they want at
anytime (Men’s focus group discussion, Zomba, March 2009).
In the absence of safety nets, the poorest farmers have difficulties in participating in the
programme. As one respondent noted
The [AISP] program targets the poorest but the poorest have problems in even getting the
K800 to buy the 50kg bag of fertilizer. Most of them could rather buy maize with that K800 to
seed their families. Some farmers who received the coupon were not able to buy fertilizer up
to now, their crops will go without fertilizer this year. The government should put in place
other programs during the rainy season that could provide money for the poorest farmers so
that the can be able to buy fertilizer.
Beyond safety nets, there were three other outcomes:
 First, as was common in 2006/07, participants said that for those people who could not find
money to redeem the coupon but still wanted to buy inputs, they could look for someone who
had enough money to redeem the coupon and then share the bag in half. Others in similar
situations just sold the coupon to buy food or drink beer
 Second, when attempts to get cash were not always successful some coupons simply went
unused.
We still have them. We have no money to buy fertilisers. We only got the seed because it is free.
We do not know anyone who managed to buy a bag of fertiliser (Women’s Focus Group
Discussion, Chikwawa, March 2009)
 Finally, as noted earlier, for other poor people who could not get their hands on cash, selling was
the only option.
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12. Input purchases and use
Respondents’ reports of input purchases allow estimation of total subsidy and unsubsidised
acquisitions. Table 16 presents these estimates for 2007/8 and 2008/9, and compares subsidy
purchases with those reported by the Logisitics Unit. As with estimation of total coupon distribution
(see table 6) , different estimates are obtained with NSO and MoAFS estimates of rural households
and for 2008/9 the fertiliser sales estimates obtained using the MoAFS farm family estimates appear
to be broadly comparable with recorded subsidy sales. However more detailed examination of the
figures shows internal discrepancies with higher (MoAFS) estimates of farm family numbers. These
discrepancies are not so great for 2007/8, but even with MoAFS farm family numbers the estimated
2007/8 subsidy sales are substantially below (75% of) recorded sales. Receipt of fertiliser coupons
reported by respondents in 2007/8 was also 75% of MoAFS allocations (see table 6).
The discrepancies between years may be explained either by failures of recall when respondents
were asked in May/June 2009 about coupon allocations and fertiliser purchases in October to
December of 2007, and/or by significant leakage of coupons and subsidised fertilisers away from
smallholders in 2007/8 – more than in either 2006/7 or 2008/9. Unsubsidised fertiliser sales,
however, are reported to have fallen from 2007/8 to 2008/9, consistent with high fertiliser prices.
This does not suggest that farmers’ recall bias is a major cause of the low 2007/8 estimates of
subsidised purchases. The change in unsubsidised fertiliser sales should also not be due to higher
2008/9 displacement of unsubsidised by subsidised sales, as subsidised fertiliser volumes were lower
and distribution of coupons earlier in 2008. Attention should not be paid to changes in tobacco
fertiliser volumes by themselves as there are very high margins of error around these estimates.
It should be noted that unsubsidised purchases include purchases (and indeed gifts) from
neighbours, relatives, traders, and the local market as well as from ADMARC, SFFRFM, private input
suppliers companies and agro-dealers. In 2008/9 traders, relatives/ neighbours, local markets,
ADMARC/SFFRFM and private companies accounted for 20%, 8%, 9%, 16% and 46% respectively of
reported unsubsidised acquisitions, with broadly similar proportions reported in 2007/8. However if
we distinguish between low and high price acquisitions in 2008/9 (where low price is less than
150Mk/kg, with much of this expected to be reselling of subsidised fertilisers) then the share of
traders, relatives/ neighbours, and local markets rises by about 10% points while the share of
ADMARC/SFFRFM and private companies fall to 7% and 25% respectively. Private companies
account for 53% of higher (standard) price sales. Low price unsubsidised acquisition amounted to
just under 40% of all unsubsidised acquisition and just over 31% of reported subsidised acquisition –
these figures are higher (just over 70% and just under 40% respectively) in the South. The extent of
low price sales may give some indication of the extent of reselling of subsidised inputs, but it should
be noted that reselling of subsidised inputs leads to potential double counting across subsidised and
unsubsidised acquisition if farmers acquire subsidised inputs and then share them or sell or give
inputs, rather than coupons, to others. Comparison of reported fertiliser purchases and reported
use suggests that purchases and receipt by smallholders of gifts and resold subsidised fertiliser
represent 28% of total subsidised fertiliser purchases by smallholders (Holden and Lunduka, 2010,
estimate just under 15%, but estimate higher trade in coupons, with a similar figure of around 30%
of total smallholder subsidised fertiliser use coming from coupons received by others).
Turning to consider seed sales, survey estimates of total subsidised purchases of hybrid seed based
on MoAFS population estimates are broadly consistent with Logistics Unit reports for both 2007/8
and 2008/9 (for 2008/9 LU reports lied between survey estimates based on NSO and MoAFS
population estimates). There are however very low survey estimates of OPV use, it is not clear why.
Estimates of other seed sales are not shown in table 16 as variation between sample areas as
regards seed availability for legumes and cotton makes survey estimates highly variable. There is
significant unsubsidised acquisition of legume and local maize seed among farmers.
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Table 16 Household survey estimates of total input purchases
Input purchases Subsidised (redeemed with coupons) Unsubsidised (purchased without coupons) Total
Fertiliser Seed Fertiliser Seed Fertiliser Seed
Maize Tobacco Total Hybrid OPV Maize Tobacco Total Hybrid OPV Maize Tobacco Total Hybrid OPV
2008/9
Kg per hhold 47.8 4.3 52.0 1.8 0.0 38.2 5.5 43.7 2.1 0.0 86.0 9.7 95.7 3.9 0.1
Lower confidence limit 43.7 3.0 46.7 0.8 0.0 28.5 3.3 31.8 1.7 0.0 72.2 6.3 78.5 2.5 0.0
Upper confidence limit 51.8 5.5 57.4 2.8 0.1 47.9 7.6 55.5 2.5 0.0 99.8 13.1 112.9 5.3 0.1
Total ‘000MT, NSO pop. est 119.3 10.6 129.9 4.6 0.1 95.5 13.7 109.1 5.3 0.1 214.8 24.3 239.1 9.8 0.2
Lower confidence limit 109.1 7.4 116.6 2.0 0.0 71.2 8.3 79.5 4.3 0.0 180.3 15.8 196.1 6.3 0.0
Upper confidence limit 129.5 13.8 143.3 7.1 0.2 119.7 19.0 138.7 6.3 0.1 249.2 32.8 282.0 13.4 0.3
Total ‘000MT, MoAFS pop. 175.4 15.6 191.0 6.7 0.1 140.3 20.1 160.4 7.7 0.1 315.7 35.7 351.5 14.4 0.2
Lower confidence limit 160.4 10.9 171.4 3.0 0.0 104.7 12.3 116.9 6.3 0.0 265.1 23.2 288.3 9.2 0.1
Upper confidence limit 190.4 20.3 210.7 10.5 0.2 176.0 27.9 203.9 9.2 0.2 366.4 48.3 414.6 19.6 0.4
LU Recorded sales (‘000MT) 178.4 19.1 197.5 4.5 0.8
2007/8
Kg per hhold 42.6 1.9 44.5 0.7 0.0 37.5 11.0 48.5 1.7 0.0 80.0 12.9 92.9 2.4 0.0
Lower confidence limit 38.2 1.2 39.4 0.6 0.0 26.0 2.6 28.6 1.4 0.0 64.3 3.8 68.0 2.0 0.0
Upper confidence limit 46.9 2.6 49.5 0.8 0.0 48.9 19.5 68.4 2.0 0.0 95.8 22.1 117.9 2.8 0.1
Total ‘000MT, NSO pop. est 106.3 4.7 111.1 1.7 0.0 93.6 27.5 121.1 4.3 0.0 199.9 32.3 232.2 6.0 0.1
Lower confidence limit 95.5 3.0 98.6 1.4 0.0 65.0 6.4 71.4 3.5 0.0 160.5 9.4 170.0 4.9 0.0
Upper confidence limit 117.2 6.5 123.6 2.0 0.1 122.1 48.7 170.8 5.1 0.1 239.3 55.1 294.4 7.0 0.1
Total‘000MT, MoAFS pop. 156.3 7.0 163.3 2.5 0.0 137.5 40.5 178.0 6.3 0.1 293.9 47.5 341.4 8.8 0.1
Lower confidence limit 140.4 4.4 144.9 2.1 0.0 95.6 9.4 105.0 5.1 0.0 236.0 13.9 249.9 7.2 0.0
Upper confidence limit 172.2 9.5 181.8 2.9 0.1 179.5 71.6 251.1 7.4 0.1 351.8 81.1 432.8 10.3 0.2
LU Recorded sales (‘000MT) 193.0 23.6 216.6 2.9 2.6
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Finally in our consideration of input use, table 17 shows the percentage of fertiliser coupons of
different types by the crops the fertiliser was used on. Almost all subsidised ‘maize fertilisers’ were
used on maize (slightly above 50% on hybrid maize) but only about 50% of subsidised ‘tobacco
fertilisers’ were applied to tobacco, the remainder being applied to maize.
Table 17 Use of fertiliser by crop and coupon type
23.21.0+4S Urea CAN D Compound
Local maize 46% 41% 29% 13%
Hybrid maize 51% 57% 37% 24%
Burley tobacco 2% 1% 34% 63%
13. Technical advice
Proper use of subsidised seed and fertiliser is an important determinant of the impact of the AISP.
Table 18 compares reported receipt of advice from field assistants by survey respondents
categorised in different ways. The percentage of respondents reporting receipt of advice in the
2006/7 season is somewhat lower than in the survey conducted in 2007 (14% compared with 22%)
but a higher proportion of the advice was perceived as useful (over 60% as compared with 50%),
with the result that the percentage of farmers reporting receipt of useful advice is similar across the
two surveys (9% in 200/9 as compared with 11% in 2006/7).
Table 18 Receipt and quality of technical advice from Field Assistants by coupon recipient by
region, gender & age of head, and subjective welfare & food security status (% households)
All households Fertiliser coupon recipients Maize coupon recipients
New varieties Fertilisers New varieties Fertilisers New varieties Fertilisers
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
% hh
with
advice
Scoring
of
advice
North 31% 3.3 32% 3.3 32% 3.4 34% 3.3 34% 3.5 36% 3.4
Centre 10% 3.3 10% 3.3 13% 3.4 12% 3.4 13% 3.4 12% 3.5
South 14% 3.2 14% 3.2 17% 3.2 16% 3.3 18% 3.3 17% 3.4
National 14% 3.2 14% 3.3 17% 3.3 17% 3.3 19% 3.4 18% 3.4
Male headed 16% 3.2 16% 3.2 19% 3.2 19% 3.3 19% 3.2 19% 3.4
Female headed 11% 3.4 10% 3.4 11% 3.4 11% 3.4 16% 3.4 15% 3.6
Poor 10% 3.0 8% 3.0 12% 3.3 9% 3.5 16% 3.4 13% 3.6
ovutika 14% 3.3 14% 3.4 16% 3.4 16% 3.3 18% 3.5 17% 3.4
Ovutikilako 17% 3.3 18% 3.2 20% 3.3 20% 3.4 20% 3.4 21% 3.4
>=wapakatikati 17% 3.2 19% 3.3 21% 3.3 22% 3.4 22% 3.5 23% 3.5
Maize for 0-3
months 7% 2.7 7% 3.0 9% 2.7 9% 2.9 11% 2.5 10% 2.6
Maize for 4-7
months 14% 3.3 14% 3.4 15% 3.4 15% 3.5 18% 3.6 17% 3.7
Maize for 8-10
months 17% 3.2 17% 3.2 20% 3.2 19% 3.3 19% 3.2 19% 3.3
Maize for >10
months 15% 3.3 16% 3.3 19% 3.4 19% 3.3 22% 3.5 22% 3.4
Scores: 1= useless; 2= not very useful; 3= average; 4=useful.
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Table 18 shows important variation in receipt of advice by different types of household, with female
headed, food insecure and lower welfare households receiving less advice. Differences in
perceptions of the quality of advice are mixed. Recipients of coupons appear to receive more advice.
Chinsinga notes that farmers and extension workers considered extension messages are to be
satisfactory, but that while farmers requested extension worker visits there are large numbers of
vacant extension posts and that in response the MoAFS is introduce more pluralistic and demand
driven extension services in collaboration with other stakeholders.
14. Diversion
It is extremely difficult to obtain estimates of diversion of coupons and inputs. These issues are
difficult to gather objective information about, although complaints about corruption are common.
As discussed earlier in section 8, the lack of transparency in coupon allocation, especially of
supplementary coupons, when combined with excess demand for coupons leads to perceptions of
and complaints about corruption and diversion of coupons even in situations where these may not
be warranted.
Ideally the scale of diversion of coupons could be determined by comparing the number of coupons
issued against the estimated number of coupons received by households. However as was clear in
information in table 6 and discussion in section 6, the divergence in estimated number of
households between the NSO census and the MoAFS farm registry makes this very difficult. Thus
with the NSO farm family estimate it appears that 2.8 million fertiliser coupons were received by
smallholder farmers in 2008/9 against a recorded allocation of 3.9 million, leading to an estimate of
1.1 million ‘missing’ coupons (28% of those issued, with nearly 50% missing in 2007/8). However
with the MoAFS farm family estimate it appears that 4.1 million fertiliser coupons were received by
smallholder farmers in 2008/9 against a recorded allocation of 3.9 million, leading to receipts
exceeding issues by 5%, while in 2007/8 24% of those issued were not received by smallholders.
Information presented in section 9 and table 16 does, however, allow more detailed examination of
these very important issues. This information is used to trace out and estimate volumes and flows of
coupons and fertilisers using the framework shown in figure2.
Total coupon issues (A)
Smallholders
coupons received (B)
Others coupons
received(C)
Smallholder
unredeemed
coupons (G)
Smallholder redeemed
coupons (H)
Other
unredeemed
coupons (J)
Other redeemed
coupons (I)
Smallholder redeemed
fertiliser use (M)
Smallholder cheap
fertiliser purchase(N)
Other cheap fertiliser
purchase(O)
Other redeemed
fertiliser use (P)
Smallholders
coupons sales (C)
Smallholders coupon
purchases (E)
Others coupons
sales (D)
Others coupons
purchases (F)
Smallholders
fertiliser sales (K)
Others fertiliser
sales (L)
l
Unrecorded, counterfeits (X)
Figure 2 Framework for estimating flows of coupons and subsidised fertilisers
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Table 19 Estimated volumes of coupon and subsidised fertiliser disbursement and purchases
2008/9 2007/8
Farm families Low (NSO) Medium High (MoAFS) Low (NSO) Medium High (MoAFS)
Coupons ('000)
Recorded issues (from MoAFS and Logistics Unit) – A 3,907 3,907 3,907 4,320 4,320 4,320
Received by smallholders, excluding purchases - B 2,654 3,278 3,903 2,123 2,622 3,121
Redemptions Total (from Logisitics Unit) - H+I 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,331 4,331 4,331
Smallholders – H 2,682 3,313 3,944 2,146 2,650 3,154
Others (by subtraction) - I 1,318 687 56 2,185 1,681 1,177
of which Unrecorded / counterfeit – X 204 231 257 100 121 142
Fertilisers (MT)
Total subsidy sales (from Logistics Unit) - H+I 200,000 200,000 200,000 216,553 216,553 216,553
Smallholder redemption & use - M 116,029 143,312 170,596 92,815 114,617 136,419
Smallholder low price purchases - N 42,549 52,553 62,556 47,229 58,325 69,420
Total smallholder use - M+N 158,578 195,865 233,152 140,044 172,941 205,839
Others' low price / redemption use - O+P 41,422 4,135 -33,152 76,509 43,612 10,714
Coupons
Recorded issues (from MoAFS and Logistics Unit) – A 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Received by smallholders, excluding purchases - B 68% 84% 100% 49% 61% 72%
Redemptions Total (from Logistics Unit) - H+I 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Smallholders – H 67% 83% 99% 50% 61% 73%
Others (by subtraction) - I 33% 17% 1% 50% 39% 27%
Unrecorded / counterfeit 5% 6% 7% 2% 3% 3%
Fertilisers
Total subsidy sales (from Logistics Unit) - H+I 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Smallholder redemption & use – M 58% 72% 85% 43% 53% 63%
Smallholder low price purchases – N 21% 26% 31% 22% 27% 32%
Total smallholder use - M+N 79% 98% 117% 65% 80% 95%
Others' low price / redemption use - O+P 21% 2% -17% 35% 20% 5%
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Table 19 provides a summary of the main elements in figure 2 for three different population
scenarios: 2.5 million farm families (as measured by the NSO 2008 census), 3.1 million farm families,
and 3.7 million farm families as reported by MoAFS. For each population scenario in 2008/9 and
2007/8, estimates are shown of coupons disbursed, received and redeemed, and of subsidised
fertiliser sales and purchases, by smallholders and ‘others’ (these encompass private companies,
parastatals, traders, local officials and leaders, etc .). The estimates are derived from a detailed
analysis following the framework in figure 2, and drawing on information presented in section 9 and
table 16. The legend shows the source and derivation of figures, and capital letters refer to the
framework in figure 2.
The key point to note from table 18 with regard to 2008/9 are as follows:
 First, for 2008/9 the estimated use by others (not smallholders) of subsidised fertiliser (that is
fertiliser originally redeemed using coupons and then either used directly by the purchaser or
sold on at a low price) is negative for the scenario with MoAFS farm family estimate. This arises
because we are able to estimate the purchases of low price fertiliser by smallholders, and with
large numbers of smallholders these purchases together with smallholders’ use of fertilisers
redeemed with their own coupons exceed the total volume of subsidised fertiliser sales. The
medium estimate of farm families allows only very small use of subsidised fertiliser by others,
but this rises to 40,000 MT (21%) with the NSO census estimate of farm families. This would
suggest that there are likely to be between 2.5 and 3.1 million farm families.
 There are estimates of substantial leakage of coupons, as smallholders receive only 68% to 84%
of coupons officially issued in 2008/9 (if we consider a maximum of 3.1 million farm families).
 There are substantial numbers of unrecorded or counterfeit coupons in circulation, with a
minimum of 160,000 (5% of officially recorded issues) in 2008/9 (this compares with 45,000
recorded by the Logistics unit and excludes unrecorded or counterfeit coupons that were not
redeemed)
 Turning to consider fertiliser sales, a large part of fertiliser purchased by non-smallholders with
coupons are sold to smallholders at lower prices than unsubsidised commercial sales (40,000 to
50,000 MT, 20 to 25% of subsidy sales), with the subsidy benefits being shared between the
smallholders and the ‘others’ who have acquired the coupons.
 Overall between around 30% and 40% of subsidised fertiliser sales are estimated to benefit non-
smallholders through diversion of coupons.
 In 2008/9 up to 20% of subsidised fertiliser sales did not reach or benefit smallholders.
 The losses to the programme and to smallholders in terms of purchases of lower priced fertiliser
are smaller than would be inferred from consideration of leakage of coupons alone, since resale
of coupons or subsidised fertiliser to smallholders gives them some (reduced) share of subsidy
benefits. Nevertheless the estimated losses to smallholders and the government are very large if
this analysis is correct. With an average full price of MK175,000 per MT of fertiliser, losses of
MK159,000 and MK84,000 per MT of diverted subsidised fertiliser used by others and by
smallholders, and a coupon price of MK2000, a rough estimate of the total value of these losses
in 2008/9 amounts to between MK4 and 9.3 billion (roughly 11 to 25% of the total programme
cost - see section 15 below depending upon the number of farm families, these numbers are
based on 3.1 and 2.5 million farm families, estimates would be lower with a larger number of
farm families). Equivalent estimates for 2007/8 are MK4.7 to 6.5 billion (roughly 33 to 45% of the
total programme cost) but these are more likely to be affected by errors of recall.
Substantially more coupons were issued in 2007/8, the number of unrecorded / counterfeit coupons
was lower and there were greater stocks of subsidised fertiliser for sale. However it appears that
there was substantially greater diversion of coupons, leading to lower purchases by smallholders and
greater volumes of diverted fertiliser, although as noted above 2007/8 estimates are more likely to
be affected by errors of recall.
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This analysis is highly significant as it gives some indications both of the number of farm families and
of the scale of diversion that may be associated with the programme, and of the relationship
between these. It thus raises very important issues that need to be addressed in taking the
programme forward to enable it to deliver the very high benefits that it offers to smallholder
farmers and the wider economy - a key issue here is the need to resolve the differences between
NSO and MoAFS figures on the number of farm families (it is understood that this is being
addressed). These issues will be returned to in later analysis of the impact of the programme, but we
note here that the analysis also informs estimation of the extent to which the fertiliser subsidy
displaces commercial sales, as we can expect low rates of displacement for smallholders redeeming
subsidised fertilisers with their own coupons, intermediate rates of displacement for smallholders
purchasing of low price fertilisers redeemed by others, and higher displacement for others who have
illegally obtained coupons for their own use or for sale to commercial farmers or urban households.
15. Programme costs
Overall costs of the programme are difficult to estimate due to failure to document the
administrative costs borne by the MoAFS and other organisations involved in the implementation of
the subsidy. The available figures therefore reflect the documented costs of the programme; the
true costs may be understated by as much as 10 percent. Nonetheless, it is evident from the
financial data that the programme has been characterized by substantial cost over-runs. In 2007/08,
the budget for the subsidy programme was US$82.1 million (6.7 percent of national budget), but
actual expenditure was estimated at US$115 million (8.9 percent of the national budget). The initial
budget for the subsidy programme in the 2008/09 budget was US$139.1 million and this was revised
upwards in the fiscal year to US$210 due to increased cost of fertilizers. These budgetary provisions
represented 60 percent and 70 percent of the MoAFS total budget allocation. Fertilizer prices
leading to the 2008/09 season nearly doubled and to maintain the quantities of fertilizers in the
programme, this became a necessary additional cost. In addition, Government decided to extend the
subsidy to other cash crops including smallholder tea and coffee, and this lead to increased
quantities and costs to the programme. The documented actual expenditure on the AISP in 2008/09
is US$271.7 million. This figure excludes the cost of implementing the programme by SFFRFM,
ADMARC the Ministry of Agriculture and other field agencies, cost of printing vouchers, and bank
charges on the 2007/08 ‘buy-back’ stock arrangement. Rather than ignore these costs we have
introduced an estimate of these costs to be equivalent to 20% of the 2008/09 recurrent budget of
the MoAFS budget net of the subsidy. This takes account of the way that most of the operations of
the MoAFS are focused on the implementation of the subsidy programme at least in the first two to
three months of the agricultural season. Although not all MoAFS activities in this period are
concerned with the subsidy programme, the majority are, and there are other costs outside this
period, as well as ADMARC/SFFRFM administration and overhead costs and the costs of field
agencies involved in coupon allocation and distribution. These estimated costs, estimated at
US$10.1 million, may therefore be considered conservative.
Figure 3 presents the trends in the cost of the agricultural input subsidy since the 2005/06
agricultural season. The extent of over-expenditure in the subsidy programme is apparent from 38
percent above the budget in 2006/07 to more than 87 percent above the budget in 2008/09. The
recorded costs are also 25 percent above the revised estimate cost of the 2008/09 programme as
reported in the 2009/10 fiscal budget. The substantial out of budget expenses in the 2008/09
programme can be attributed to substantial increases in the fertilizer prices and the expansion of the
programme to cover smallholder tea and coffee farmers. According to the budget documents, the
original plan for the programme was to procure 170,000 metric tonnes of fertilizers but in the course
of the year an additional 72,000 metric tonnes were procured to accommodate the extension of
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coverage to smallholder tea and coffee farmers (GOM, 2009). Logistics Unit figures reported earlier
put additional purchases at just under 48,500 metric tonnes for the subsidy programme plus 24,500
for flood relief, making a total of just under 73,000 metric tonnes . The inclusion of cash crops such
as coffee and tea was more politically motivated; 2009 being an election year smallholder tea and
coffee farmers lobbied during the year to benefit from the subsidy programme on grounds of the
substantial increase in the cost of fertilizers.
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Figure 3 Trends in Agricultural Input Subsidy Costs, 2005/06 – 2008/09
Note: All costs are net of farmers redemption.
Sources: Logistics Units reports; Dorward and Chirwa (2009)
The first part of table 20 shows the cost structure of the 2008/09 subsidy programme covering only
recorded costs. These amount to There are also many other unrecorded or unattributed direct costs
of the subsidy programme including the operating costs of MoAFS and other government officials
involved in the implementation, SFFRFM and ADMARC, cost of maintaining ADMARC markets, the
cost of printing coupons and bank charges on the 2007/08 ‘buy back’ arrangement. The extent of
some of the unrecorded costs is also a concern of some of the project implementers. At district level,
members of staff in the implementation of the programme are drawn from several government
ministries including agriculture, community development, forestry, education and health. Some of
the departments also provided vehicles towards the implementation of the subsidy programme. As
one of the District Agricultural Development Officers in the Central Region put it:
“The programme should continue but it needs a lot of resources. The funding that we
get [for administration] is not enough to cover everything. We still owe huge sums of
money in allowance to those who participated, especially the police. We owe them
over MK1 million. We have just paid MK0.8 million. This exercise is expensive: it
involves vehicles, fuel, allowances. But the programme should continue because it is
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better than the government having to import maize. Importing maize can be very
expensive.”
As noted earlier, it has not been possible to obtain information on costs of subsidised grain storage
and cotton chemicals and these are not included in table 20.
Donors contribute to the subsidy directly and through budget support. The direct support
constitutes 14.1 percent of the estimated total costs and cover costs of seeds, logistic unit operating
costs and computer equipment support to ADMARC. Donors also support the subsidy indirectly
through budget support. According to GOM (2009: Budget Statement), the increased costs of
fertilizers in the 2008/09 programme ‘was mostly financed by increased budget support from donors
notably DFID, European Union, and the African Development Bank’.
Table 20 Cost and Financing of the 2008/09 AISP
Description Malawi Kwacha
Recorded costs
Seeds - flexible vouchers 733,654,720
Seeds – maize 1,026,098,420
Fertiliser - "Buy back" from 2007/08 3,482,982,390
Fertiliser - new supplies\ 33,268,171,569
Transport Costs 1,293,749,348
Logistics Unit operational costs 33,868,647
Computers for ADMARC 9,081,742
Total recorded costs 39,847,606,836
Less: Farmer redemption due 3,236,445,440
Unused stock for buyback 2,775,922,782
Net recorded Costs 33,835,238,614
Estimated other costs*
Fertiliser buy back bank costs 87,074,560
Ministry of Agriculture operations 1,100,000,000
ADMARC/SFFRFM overheads 176,780,275
Voucher printing 20,000,000
Other agencies' field costs 32,000,000
Total estimated other costs 1,415,854,835
Total net costs, recorded and estimated 35,251,093,449
Funding
Direct Donor Support 5,285,685,919
Government of Malawi 29,965,407,530
* Actual figures for these items are not known. Bank charges on the buy back arrangement are
estimated at 2.5% of value of the stock (and compare with MK55 million in 2006/7). We estimate that
MoAFS operational costs on the subsidy are equivalent to 20% of the recurrent MoAFS expenditure
budget (net of subsidy) as MoAFS operations are largely but not exclusively focused on the subsidy
implementation for at least three months in an agricultural season. SFFRFM and ADMARC overheads
are estimated at 0.5% of fertiliser sales value (this is probably an under-estimate, but it is very difficult
to determine an appropriate figure). Voucher printing is increased by 33% from 2006/7. Field costs
paid to other agencies involved in coupon allocation and distribution based on FGD information from
one district. Outstanding costs of retrieving fertilizer from unit markets (not recorded by April 2009)
are not estimated. Communications and monitoring and evaluation costs excluded.
Source of recorded costs: Logistics Unit Final Report 2009
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16. Conclusions
Implementation of the subsidy programme in 2008/9 in many ways followed approaches of previous
years. Significant changes in 2008/9 were the exclusion of the private sector from retailing of
subsidised fertilisers and the introduction of open meetings for coupon allocation in villages. We
briefly review here the major conclusions arising from earlier information and discussion in this
report.
Systems for fertiliser and seed procurement, distribution and sales are considered in more detail in a
separate report on the input supply sector. We note here greater reliance on the private sector for
importation and earlier fertiliser import tendering in 2008/9, but continuing difficulties with late
tender awards and some non- and late deliveries. Despite this there were still difficulties in holding
stocks due to late opening of sales from unit markets, linked to late distribution of coupons. These
difficulties were exacerbated by the exclusion of the private sector from participation in retail sales
of subsidised fertilisers, and further exacerbated by the lateness of the decision to do this.
Nevertheless some reduction in late deliveries for sale through ADMARC / SFFRFM compared with
the previous year is to be commended. Lack of legume seeds was a major constraint to the
programme contributing to more diverse cropping.
Difficulties with coupon security were encountered with the initial printing, requiring a second
printing of more secure coupons, which appears to have been successful. Improved security features
were not accompanied by the introduction of bar coding, which could be used for improving both
security and tracking of coupons. The evidence of substantial diversion of coupons requires urgent
further attention to improving security features for coupons and/or the introduction of other systems
(for example using electronic cards).
There has been a continued increase in the share of coupons allocated to the Southern region and
coupon allocation across the Centre and South is now much more equitable in terms of coupons
received per household, but is still high in the North. This has important targeting implications as
regards the focus of the programme and should also affect displacement of unsubsidised sales by
subsidised sales. This will be examined in more detail in a later report, but analysis of 2006/7
fertiliser use suggests that displacement is lower among poorer households and since the incidence
of poverty is higher in the south, greater allocation of coupons to the south has the potential to
reduce displacement and hence increase the effectiveness of the programme. This is discussed
further in the separate report on subsidy impacts.
As in previous years, the issue of a second round of ‘supplementary’ vouchers lacks transparency
and is difficult to track. This is evident from both analysis of programme implementation and the
perceptions of different stakeholders in rural areas. Thus while the introduction of open meetings
for allocation and distribution of initial fertiliser and seed coupons is widely reported and
commended, rural people were much less aware of processes involved in the issuing of
supplementary vouchers. Greater involvement of MoAFS staff in coupon distribution is also
commended. Problems remain, however, with lack of transparency and accountability regarding
both the total allocation of coupons to areas/communities and their allocation within
areas/communities. These are inevitably linked, and more transparency about the total allocation of
coupons to areas/communities could significantly improve trust, transparency and accountability in
the allocation of coupons within areas/communities. A universal allocation of smaller entitlements
to 50kg of fertiliser is recommended to improve targeting and transparency and to reduce diversion.
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With the elimination of the tobacco fertilisers subsidy and a likely smaller number of farming
households (2.5 to 3.1 million) this would lead to a subsidy for a total of 125,000 to 155,000MT of
fertiliser – close to disbursements in 2005/6 and 2009/10 and a very significant amount, much
greater than prior to 2005/6.
Estimation of the diversion of coupons and subsidised inputs from intended smallholder
beneficiaries to others is rendered difficult by the lack of agreement between the NSO and MoAFS
on the number of farm families in the country. It appears that MoAFS overestimates the number of
farm families to some extent (but the scale of this is not clear) and that there is significant diversion
of coupons, and some use of counterfeit or unrecorded coupons. Current plans to resolve the
discrepancies in farm family estimates must urgently be pursued as this has important implications
not only for the AISP, but also for other government services if the census has underestimated the
national population. Effective controls and auditing procedures are also needed to prevent and,
where it happens, identify and punish fraud. The use of a universal subsidy linked to some form of
identify card could provide an effective means to control diversion and subsidy volumes.
Targeting of coupons continues to be an important issue. This affects the dynamics of coupon
allocation and distribution, use of coupons, benefits from coupon use, and as noted above,
displacement. There is continuing lack of clarity and consistency in the application of the targeting
criteria used, though their formulation, communication and application appears to have significantly
improved since 2006/7. This is evident from focus group discussions and from survey data which, as
in 2006/7, show that though the poor are not excluded from receiving coupons, they are less likely
to receive coupons than less poor people. There are also concerns that targeting is leading to
dissatisfaction and conflict within rural communities. Among rural communities and different
stakeholders there continue to be diverse views regarding the best way to address this. As noted
earlier there are strong arguments that there could be significant gains from a universal access to
coupons for 50kg fertiliser per household (as already practiced in many areas through redistribution).
This has the potential to reduce exclusion errors, targeting costs, displacement and intra-community
conflicts, and to improve transparency and accountability without adversely affecting incremental
production and benefits.
The vast majority of recipients report that they use their coupons to buy inputs and use the inputs
on their own crops. However FGDs and stakeholders consider sales of coupons and of subsidised
inputs to be more prevalent, particularly the latter. Analysis of reported household purchases
suggests that smallholder purchases of resold subsidy fertilisers are between 10% and 20% of
smallholder subsidised input purchases. As in previous years, many coupon recipients faced stock-
outs, queues and demands for extra payments or ‘tips’ when redeeming coupons, particularly for
fertilisers. There is some evidence that distances to stockists, time spent redeeming inputs, and
payment of ‘tips’ all increased in 2008/9 as compared with 2006/7. Some stakeholders and focus
group discussion link this to the lack of private sector involvement in retail sales of fertilisers.
Reliance on ADMARC and SFFRFM as the sole distributors of subsidised fertilisers increases the risks
of poor services to subsidy beneficiaries. Private sector distribution of subsidised inputs should be re-
introduced with stringent agreements and monitoring and audit systems to control irregularities in
both parastatal and private sector outlets.
Whereas 80% or so of male coupon recipients and less poor coupon recipients rely on savings to
finance coupon redemption, 66% of female and 60% of poor recipients can rely on savings, with
ganyu, safety net programmes and gifts all being more important for poorer recipients. Focus group
discussions emphasise the challenges that poor households face in finding the money to redeem
coupons, and the way that these problems are exacerbated by demands for redemption ‘tips’,
particularly when there are queues at markets. There is continuing need for safety net programmes’
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coverage, targeting and timing to better complement the AISP so that they both (a) help poor
recipients to redeem coupons and (b) prevent poorer recipients from being disqualified from coupon
receipt (on the grounds of inability to redeem coupons).
A relatively low proportion of households and recipients (14 and 18% respectively, higher in the
north) report that they receive advice from field assistants on fertilisers and new varieties. These low
rates of contact with field assistants may affect the efficient of use of inputs by smallholder farmers.
Increased attention should be given to investments to complement access to subsidised inputs with
access to technical advice.
Costs of the programme have increased dramatically due largely to high prices for fertilisers in
2008/ and to increases in subsidised fertiliser volumes from 2005/6 to 2007/8. There is a consistent
tendency for actual costs to exceed budgeted costs, for the same reasons. The trend in increasing
fertiliser costs together with falling coupon redemption prices also implies that the level of the
subsidy to farmers continues to increase. It has not been possible to obtain information on the full
costs of the programme. Improved systems are needed for controlling fraud (diverted and counterfeit
coupons) and the release of extra coupons, for auditing systems, for cost control, and for determining
and implementing the appropriate scale of the programme and subsidy rates. These are related to
targeting systems, the involvement of the private sector in subsidised seed and fertiliser sales as
discussed above.
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Glossary of Acronyms and Terms
ADD Agricultural Development Division
ADMARC Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
agro-dealers Small scale private input retailers
AISAM Agricultural Input Suppliers Association of Malawi
AISP Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme
AISS Agricultural Input Subsidy Survey
AU African Union
Bomas District administrative / commercial centres
CNFA Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs
CPI Consumer Price Index
DfID Department for International Development
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Dimba Wetland cultivated in the dry season
EU European Union
FEWSNET Famine Early Warning System Network
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Ganyu hired casual labour
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GOM Government of Malawi
IHS2 Integrated Household Survey (2004)
IMF International Monetary Fund
LU Logistics Unit
MASAF Malawi Social Action Fund
MK Malawi Kwacha (MK140 to the US$)
MOAFS Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MRFC Malawi Rural Finance Company
MVAC Malawi Vulnerability Action Committee
NASFAM National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi
NEPAD New Economic Partnership for African Development
NFRA National Food Reserve Agency
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPV Net Present Value
NSO National Statistical Office
OPV Open pollinated varieties (of maize)
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBM Reserve Bank of Malawi
SFFRFM Smallholder Farmers’ Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi
SGR Strategic Grain Reserve
TIP Targeted Inputs Program
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Appendix 1: Voucher allocations by district
District Initial (September) allocation Extra allocations Final (January)
allocation
Farm hh Final vouchers/hh Extra vouchers/hh
NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize Seed CAN, D
compound
Flexi seed NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize
Seed
NPK, Urea
(each)
Maize
Seed
(2008) NPK, Urea
(each)
Seed NPK, Urea
(each)
Seed
Chitipa 25,259 25,259 8,541 14,238 4,691 610 29950 25,869 50,309 1.19 0.80 0.186 0.012
Karonga 21,831 21,831 3,207 16,988 12,041 460 33872 22,291 60,032 1.13 0.65 0.401 0.008
Rumphi 26,400 26,400 12,180 14,790 7,331 4,250 33731 30,650 52,918 1.27 0.86 0.277 0.080
Likoma 640 640 0 595 1,621 40 2261 680 2,102 2.15 0.61 1.542 0.019
Nkhata Bay 21,896 21,896 200 15,787 8,251 670 30147 22,566 55,781 1.08 0.69 0.296 0.012
Mzimba 70,500 70,500 19,080 72,877 119,921 26,340 190421 96,840 257,503 1.48 0.66 0.931 0.102
Kasungu 79,618 79,618 25,470 55,074 21,491 2,910 101109 82,528 195,349 1.04 0.70 0.220 0.015
Mchinji 62,500 62,500 17,560 41,732 8,701 700 71201 63,200 147,456 0.97 0.71 0.118 0.005
Ntchisi 30,000 30,000 14,080 25,138 6,081 900 36081 30,900 88,822 0.81 0.63 0.137 0.010
Dowa 68,700 68,700 24,500 40,411 9,291 2,210 77991 70,910 190,862 0.82 0.58 0.097 0.012
Nkhotakota 24,784 24,784 715 20,602 12,751 3,670 37535 28,454 72,795 1.03 0.67 0.350 0.050
Salima 34,500 34,500 1,102 24,080 6,261 1,680 40761 36,180 85,086 0.96 0.71 0.147 0.020
Lilongwe 118,789 118,789 20,818 113,542 22,221 5,640 141010 124,429 443,169 0.64 0.54 0.100 0.013
Dedza 65,050 65,050 5,039 51,573 5,731 1,750 70781 66,800 211,754 0.67 0.56 0.054 0.008
Ntcheu 67,500 67,500 5,175 39,739 7,351 770 74851 68,270 140,413 1.07 0.77 0.105 0.005
Balaka 40,841 40,841 2,820 27,446 6,128 70 46969 40,911 100,350 0.94 0.68 0.122 0.001
Mangochi 50,088 50,088 4,920 64,896 28,690 21,090 78778 71,178 249,236 0.63 0.55 0.230 0.085
Machinga 62,315 62,315 4,657 44,583 12,132 1,140 74447 63,455 176,176 0.85 0.61 0.138 0.006
Zomba 74,387 74,387 8,510 54,066 12,941 110 87328 74,497 197,508 0.88 0.65 0.131 0.001
Chiradzulu 55,359 55,359 4,596 25,482 4,883 200 60242 55,559 90,035 1.34 0.90 0.108 0.002
Phalombe 71,273 71,273 5,784 25,795 4,403 431 75676 71,704 91,148 1.66 1.07 0.097 0.005
Mulanje 69,093 69,093 978 54,121 15,062 4,060 84155 73,153 160,552 1.05 0.79 0.188 0.025
Thyolo 88,302 88,302 2,942 49,437 34,712 29,720 123014 118,022 174,709 1.41 0.96 0.397 0.170
Blantyre 83,661 83,661 5,565 40,370 5,464 80 89125 83,741 144,191 1.24 0.86 0.076 0.001
Mwanza 21,802 21,802 875 10,211 344 30 22146 21,832 25,419 1.74 1.26 0.027 0.001
Neno 12,868 12,868 355 8,609 4,050 4,050 16918 16,918 29,967 1.13 0.85 0.270 0.135
Chikwawa 11,074 11,074 0 30,615 738 110 11812 11,184 118,176 0.20 0.35 0.012 0.001
Nsanje 10,970 10,970 0 17,204 404 90 11374 11,060 60,790 0.37 0.46 0.013 0.001
Unallocated 130,000 130,000 331 0 -130,000 -113,780 0 16,220
Total North 166,526 166,526 43,208 135,275 153,856 32,370 320,382 198,896 478,645 1.34 0.70 0.643 0.068
Total Centre 551,441 551,441 114,459 411,891 99,879 20,230 651,320 571,671 1,575,706 0.83 0.62 0.127 0.013
Total South 652,033 652,033 42,002 452,835 129,951 61,181 781,984 713,214 1,618,257 0.97 0.72 0.161 0.038
Total All 1,500,000 1,500,000 200,000 1,000,001 253,686 1 1,753,686 1,500,001 3,672,608 0.96 0.68 0.138 0.000
